In 2012, the US Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues issued a report on Privacy and Progress in Whole Genome Sequencing (1 ) . This report made recommendations on the balance between research advancements and privacy risks derived from whole-genome sequencing. Some of the recommendations from the Commission included strong data protection, informed consent, and the establishment of consistent genomic privacy protection between states. The Commission's recommendation for consent before whole-genome sequencing came with exceptions for legitimate law enforcement purposes. Indeed, the report specifically recommended that " [o] nly in exceptional circumstances should entities such as law enforcement or defense and security have access to biospecimens or whole genome sequence data for non health-related purposes without consent" (1 ) . This authorized use of genomic data by law enforcement should be considered in the context of the 2013 revelation of the US National Security Agency's secret data collection and surveillance program of Internet users (2 ) . In the near future, publicly available whole-genome sequencing data may be similarly examined and surveyed by law enforcement or government agencies.
On one end of the DNA privacy spectrum are the millions of DNA short tandem repeat (STR) 5 identification profiles in government, health care, and commercial databases. These STR identification profiles are characterizations of small regions of DNA sequence data that contain sufficient information to identify individuals or relatives of individuals by matching a set of maternal and paternal alleles. This powerful identification tool has been used for several decades in the setting of bone marrow transplantation, law enforcement, paternity lawsuits, and military identification. On the other end of the DNA privacy spectrum is the emergence of whole-genome sequencing; these data sets contain both protein coding and noncoding DNA, including STR regions. Genomic data sets contain information on current and future diseases and are essential for the future discovery of genetic etiologies of disease. The Commission noted that although a person's genomic data is unique, the data could be deidentified by removing the link between the data and common identifiers (e.g., name, date of birth, home address). In this scenario, reidentification of the person would be difficult without a method of linking back to the common identifiers. The analogy used by the Commission was that fingerprints are unique, but they are useful only when the fingerprint information exists in a database linked to the common identifiers of a person. The Commission stated that although whole-genome sequence data are "uniquely identifiable," they are not currently "readily identifiable" (1 ). Thus, genomic data is unique for each person, but does not automatically identify an individual. In their 2012 report, the Commission did not extend the fingerprint analogy to recognize the possibility that existing databases of DNA STR identification profiles may be used as a link between genomic data and a person's common identifiers. Sequencing technologies and software algorithms are emerging that make it possible to derive STR profiles from whole-genome sequencing data sets. Publicly available whole-genome data sets may become a resource for the reidentification of individuals or their relatives by linking their whole genome-derived STR profiles with common identifiers in DNA STR identification profile databases.
In the US, DNA STR profiling has become commonplace in forensics and law enforcement. Thirteen specific STR loci are used by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). Currently, Ͼ11 million individual CODIS STR profiles are held in tightly controlled databases with access limited to authorized individuals. In the case of CODIS, STR profiles are not only from convicted offenders, arrestees, and missing persons, but also from the departments of Defense and Homeland Security. The CODIS database contains only the STR profiles and not the common identifiers of a person; however, submitting entities maintain the data linking common identifiers to STR profiles. Separate from the CODIS database are also commercial databases, hospital databases (i.e., bone marrow engraftment analysis), and international agencies from foreign governments (e.g., the International Criminal Police Organization) that use the same or a similar set of STR loci. The DNA STR identification profile is a potent tool when combined with searchable databases. The power of this identification tool lies with those who have access to the databases.
The possibility of extracting STR profile information from whole-genome data sets is highlighted by a recent study that examined STR variation for 1009 individuals in phase 1 of the 1000 Genomes Project (3 ). This study examined 689 512 STR loci across human genomes; the 13 STR loci used by CODIS were thus a very small subset. Reliable allelic spectra were obtained for 90% of the STR loci across all genomes. Furthermore, in comparison to standard capillary electrophoresis evaluation, STR loci determined from whole-genome data sets were correct in 89.5% of cases when the loci were homozygous (same maternal and paternal alleles) and correct in 12.8% of cases when the loci were heterozygous (different maternal and paternal alleles). The accuracy of heterozygous loci was dependent on higher depths of sequencing coverage; the more sequencing information at a position correlated with improved accuracy. In addition, the heterozygous loci had poor accuracy due to allele dropout when the length of an allele was longer than the sequencing read length. When the 13 CODIS STR loci were examined in 3 subpopulations, allelic spectra were not seen for 3 loci. The frequency spectra of 2 of the remaining 10 loci did not match a previously published study that used conventional STR evaluation by capillary electrophoresis. The lack of allelic spectra on 3 loci and the mismatch of frequency spectra statistics of 2 other loci were ascribed to DNA sequencing read lengths that were too short to span the STR loci.
Separately, for the purposes of this article, we reanalyzed the data from this prior study to focus on the 13 CODIS STR loci across all 1009 individual genome data sets (Fig. 1) . On average, 4.86 CODIS STR loci were identified in each individual genome. A conservative data reanalysis looking at loci unique from a reference genome revealed only 1 individual with 13 identifiable CODIS STR loci. The majority of genomes had Յ5 unique CODIS STR loci identified. Thus, only a minority of individual genomes in this data set had CODIS STR loci that could be used for an identity match. However, as mentioned by the authors of the original investigation, the quality of STR analysis may be improved in a recently released data set that was sequenced with longer read lengths (Phase 3, 1000 Genomes Project).
The possibility of reidentification of genome research participants is not surprising. Indeed, a recent report from the International Cancer Genome Consortium (ICGC) summarized multiple historic examples of the potential for reidentifying participants in genomic research (4 ). Based on this historic trend of increasing possibility of reidentification, the ICGC established a working group to provide guidance on securing genomic data and associated personal identifiers. A key feature of the ICGC report is the recognition that genomic reidentification is a dynamic risk that needs to be minimized, but that some risk will always exist. The key principles of the ICGC working group recommendations are the removal of unique identifiers, restriction of access, and informed consent of study participants.
The intersection of DNA STR identification profiles and whole-genome sequencing has begun, and there are obvious societal implications. For individuals that choose to publicly post their whole-genome data sets in association with their identity, they risk providing their CODIS STR profiles as well as a potential link to their All 1009 individuals in phase 1 of the 1000 Genome Project who were previously examined for overall STR loci were reanalyzed for the specific 13 CODIS STR loci (3 ). In brief, the previously derived .vcf file generated by the lobSTR algorithm was reanalyzed using a bed file specific for the genomic coordinates of each of the 13 CODIS STR loci. The x-axis shows the maximum number of CODIS STR loci identified (0 -13) in each individual genome. The y-axis enumerates the number of individual genomes with those loci identified.
biological relatives. Similarly, individuals participating in genome research studies should be aware that their genome data can be used to determine their CODIS STR profile. These STR profiles do not yield direct reidentification but may be queried by commercial and governmental entities with access to STR profile databases. These queries may be used not only to search and reidentify individuals participating in research, but also for the search and identification of biological relatives.
Fortunately, the current publicly available wholegenome data sets such as in the 1000 Genomes Project do not have informative CODIS STR loci for the majority of individuals. However, with each technical improvement in sequencing technology [e.g., increased DNA sequencing read length, improved depth of DNA sequencing coverage, and improved algorithms for aligning and interpreting repetitive sequences (5 )], there is an increasing possibility of reidentification of individuals by those who have access to DNA STR profile databases. To protect the DNA privacy of individuals participating in whole-genome sequencing, there needs to be constant vigilance to identify and protect against the possible misuse of information.
